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Investment Banks invest in R&D to design innovative securities even when imitation is possible, i.e.,
when innovations cannot be patented. We show how a …nancial institution can pro…t from the de-
velopment of …nancial products even if they are unpatentable. For certain types of …nancial products
innovating investment bankshave an information advantage over imitators. This information advantage
makes them better competitors and market leaders. The mere possibility of costless imitation drives
innovators’ pro…ts down, but still keeps them positive.
The absence of patents allows part of the surplus generated by the innovation to be allocated to
investors. The extent of surplus sharing depends on the degree of asymmetry in the information owned
by imitators and innovators and on the total number of innovators. The larger this asymmetry, the
higher the innovator’s pro…ts and the lower the investor’s surplus. With more than one innovator all
the surplus goes to investors. (JEL: G24, L12, K20).
KE YW ORDS: Financial innovation, imperfect imitation, patents.1 Introduction
Unlike other product innovations, a striking feature of new …nancial securities is that they cannot be
patented, as documented by Tufano[9].1 Industrial Organization Theory has shown that in the absence
of a patent …rms will not pay the R&D cost to develop a certain product if imitators can copy the
product, free-riding on the development stage.2 Despite the absence of patents, innovation in …nancial
securities has been a permanent phenomenon in …nancial markets. This shows that the …nancial sector
is capable of evolving without them. The important question of how this can happen remains to be
addressed.
Some types of …nancial innovations di¤er crucially from other more general forms of non-…nancial
innovations, such as a new pharmaceutical. The latter can be imitated perfectly once it starts to be
distributed (its formula is observed and can be duplicated immediately), and therefore patent protec-
tion is crucial to make the investment in its development pro…table for a pharmaceutical company by
foreclosing …erce competition from imitators that free-ride on the development cost.3 For innovative
structured …nance products, such as some variations of Credit Derivative or Collateralized Debt Oblig-
ations, the story is di¤erent. The required disclosure of their benchmark contracts (terms-sheet) or
the mere observation of the traded product do not reveal the underlying hedging mechanisms and the
money making schemes that are concealed behind it. As a J.P. Morgan Credit Derivatives Trader puts
it:
“Everybody can see the laid-out contract but what I am very careful not to disclose are the positions in my
1Since the resolution of the “State Street Case” (State Street Bank vs Signature Financial Group) in Jannuary 1999,
…nancial formulas and methods have become patentable. See Lerner for a description of recent patenting awards in …nance.
Financial securities, however, are unpatentable by their very nature: by the time a patent can be awarded (at least one
year) , the design would most likely have been imitated already and the market ine¢ciency the innovation was exploitiong
would be erased.
2See Tirole [8, Ch. 10] for a survey of models that analyze incentives to create new techonological innovations.
3According to a survey by Levin et al. [6], Pharmaceuticals, Medical Appliances Organic Chemicals and Steel Mill
products are industries that rely fully on patents. All other industries rely signi…cantly on them. The securities industry
seems to be the only one that by its nature does not and cannot rely on patents at all.
1book. With this information you could track down the logic and see where I make money. Without it you
could not price correctly the product, break down the risks involved, and understand what the components
are. New ideas are not easily imitated: the developing process is a set of complex skills that are not easy
to acquire”. (Andrei Paracivescu, JP Morgan).
This means that there is a fundamental di¤erence between these …nancial innovations and non-
…nancial ones: some new …nancial products, by their nature, cannot be imitated perfectly in the short
run.
In this paper we show that a Financial Institution can pro…t from the development of some innov-
ative …nancial products such as private securities. As noted, these are completely unpatentable, unlike
non-…nancial innovations and are, therefore, potentially imitable by competitors. Since the money mak-
ing scheme behind the new product is not fully observable and understandable, the imitation will be
imperfect. The innovator, in other words, will enjoy a …rst-mover advantage that will make the patent
inessential for the pro…tability of the endeavor.4
Constructing a general theory of pro…table innovation in …nancial markets may be too ambitious
given the large array of …nancial products that have been introduced, and the di¤erent characteristics
of the innovators involved.5 However, our argument best applies to a variety of new private securities
created by IBs in the last two decades. Representative examples are debt capital market highly struc-
tured products such as variations of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), CMOs, and the many
variations of these.
In this paper, an information …rst-mover advantage will make unpatentable …nancial innovation
pro…table. As we will see, this advantage will make the innovator a better competitor than imitators
and allow him to price his product above marginal cost in equilibrium. The main purpose of the model
4See Herrera andSchroth[4] fora model where the …rst-moveradvantage consists ofan informationasymmetry generated
endogenously in the period before imitation.
5In many cases the incentive to innovate is the image value for an IB of being recognized as a lead innovator.
2is to analyze thewelfare implications that arise from the creation of new securities. Weanalyze how the
surpluscreated by theinnovation issharedbetweeninnovators, imitatorsand investors. Moreimportant,
the absence of a patent may bene…t investors. We show how the mere presence of imitation,although
imperfect, limits the pro…tability ofthe innovation and allows the investors to get a share of the surplus
generated by the innovation. If the latter could be patented, the surplus would go entirely to the
innovator at the expense of investors.
The paper is divided into two main parts. In the …rst part we consider those innovations for which
the event that two di¤erent IBs that invested in R&D discover the exact same new security occurs with
zero probability. In this case, for any given innovation there will only be one innovator. In the second
part of the paper we consider those innovations which can possibly be independently developed by all
IBs at the same time. These will be called “obvious” innovations.6
In the next section we brie‡y review some related literature. Then, we model what we understand
by an innovative security. In the fourth section we describe investors’ behavior and how securities are
priced depending on the identity of the IB, i.e., the knowledge that investors have on the quality of
information owned by each issuer. The next two sections deal with the case of one innovator: Section
5 characterizes the equilibria of the Bertrand Game and Section 6 discusses the welfare distributive
implications: how surplus is shared between IBs and Investors in equilibrium.
In the remaining sections we deal with “obvious” innovations: in Section 7 we introduce the inno-
vation game. We will show how the One Innovator Case mentioned above will arise as a particular
equilibrium of a two-stage game: in the …rst stage the decision whether to innovate or not is made,
and in the second, price competition takes place after the new security is issued and imitated. We
proceed by solving for the equilibria at each stage of the game by backwards induction and pin down
the equilibrium payo¤s for all the second stage subgames. In Section 8 we establish the propositions
6These innovations are new security designs waiting to emerge as a consequence of changes in the economic or legal
environments. Thus, all IBs that invest in R&D will eventually discover the same security.
3that characterize all the pure and mixed strategy equilibria. We determine the equilibrium number of
innovators for all of them. Finally, in Section 9 we describe how the total surplus of the innovation is
distributed across innovators, imitators and investors depending on the equilibrium selected. The …nal
section summarizes our results and discusses their relevance brie‡y.
2 Related Literature
Most of the literature on Financial Innovation has directed its attention towards explaining what new
securities are and what creates a demand for new security designs. Although these studies identify
possible reasons for the enduring demand for innovation in these markets, the reason for and the e¤ect
of the lack of patents for …nancial products have hardly been addressed by the literature.
Tufano [9] has illustrated empirically some features of this process but has not analyzed why the
patent is not needed. The most important fact is that innovators end up being market leaders for the
securities they introduced. Allen and Gale [1, Ch. 3] explain this market shares fact using a simple
model in which the innovating IB is the Stackelberg leader of the imitating IBs. Thus, the innovator
has the ability to pre-empt imitators and ends up with a larger market share during the imitation
phase. This makes R&D expenditures pro…table when patents cannot be obtained. But, as they point
out, their analysis treats the security as any other commodity with a given downward sloping demand
function. In our model, IBs will compete in prices rather than quantities. Indeed, price competition is
more appropriate than quantity competition for the study of competitive banks.7
7In asset markets, where demand will exhibit a large elasticity, issuers will undercut each other in prices rather than
compete in quantities á la Cournot.
43 Information and Product Design
In this model, we consider an innovative security to be a new …nancial product sold to investors that
exploits a recently discovered market ine¢ciency. For instance, this technology can consist ofa new way
ofpooling correlated cash ‡owsofdi¤erent types ofexisting securities, selling portions to investors after
matching cash ‡ows of similar risk rating or an improved way to hedge a partially uncovered risk. Any
kind of new security creation involves some knowledge about the state of the world. The more re…ned
this knowledge is, the better security an IB will make. As we show later, we keep the main intuition
simple by dealing with risk-neutral investors. In this sense, by better security we mean a security with
higher expected return.
The central idea is that imitation cannot be perfect. Even though the absence of patent protection
allows imitators to duplicate the idea ofthe new security without paying the R&D cost, the mere R&D
experience gives the innovators an information advantage. Innovators will have a …ner partition of the
states of the world space relevant for the creation of the new security. This will allow them, in general,
to create a product with higher expected value:
E['In] >E['Im]: (1)
This can be enhanced by a learning process, but it goes beyond the scope of this paper. Next, we
formalize this information asymmetry problem and its consequence for the design implementation.
3.1 Information Structure
Inthismodel weassumethat therearetwodi¤erent levelsofknowledgeon thedistribution ofthestateof
the world. The stateof the world is z 2 Z =f1; 2; :::;Ng: Innovators and imitators both have the same
prior distribution (°1;°2;:::;°N) de…ned over Z. However, innovators have further private information
5which is not revealed to imitators. This information can be described by a totally informative signal
j 2 f1; :::;Mg that selects an element of a given partition fZ1; Z2; :::;ZMg of Z. The signal j reveals
that z 2 Zj ½Z8.
We will illustrate the basic idea with a simpleexample and leave the general result to the appendix.
3.1.1 A simple example
Suppose there are two states of the world, z = 1;2: The imitator has no information on the true
realization but has a probability distribution on z: The innovator, on the other hand, has perfect
knowledge on the actual state. Given this knowledge, IBs will choose a to maximize a function '(a;z)
which is conditional on the state z. In this model, a is a real variable de…ned in a compact set that
summarizes the inner characteristic of the security given by its design. '(:) is a real valued continuous
function of a that represents the returns of the new security.
Innovator’s problem After observing z = 1 or z =2; the innovator chooses a to maximize '(a;z):
Let the solution to this problem be given by aIn = a(z); and for each state let 'In(z) = '(aIn; z) be
the maximized value for the security’s return function.
Imitator’s problem Since the imitator does not observe z he uses his beliefs on the true state to
solve the following problem:
choose a to maximize °1'(a; 1) +°2'(a; 2); (2)
where naturally °1 +°2 = 1:
In this case, the choice of a is not contingent on the actual state. Let aIm be the solution to this
8In Herrera and Schroth [4] we generate this signal endogenously and show how this information asymmetry guarantees
condition (1).
6problem, and 'Im(z) ='(aIm; z) be the return on each state.
Proposition 1 8z, 'In(z) ¸ 'Im(z):
Proof. If z =1; for every aIm; 'In(1) = max
a '(a; 1) ¸'(aIm; 1) ='Im(1). Likewise, for z =2:
The intuition is that the innovator knows the objective whereas the imitator knows it only up to a
probability distribution. The innovator can always make the same choice as the imitator, and generi-
cally, given his …ner knowledge he can do better and will obtain a higher return (the inequality will be
strict). For this simple case, we have shown this way that the innovator’s security …rst order stochas-
tically dominates its imitation. This is a stronger result than the simple expected value dominance.
It guarantees that given relative prices, even risk-averse investors will only choose to hold one type of
security and not diversify across innovative securities and their imitations. This is true however only if
the innovator has complete knowledge of the state z. In the appendix we explore a more general case,
where only the weaker result E['In] >E['Im] is obtained.
4 Investor’s and Banks Objectives
4.1 Demand for Financial Products
We assume that there is a …xed number q of identical investors, each one endowed with a unit of cash
for investment in a portfolio of assets. These investors have access to a new type of securities issued by
both, imitators and innovators, which pay one-period given returns of 'Im and 'In; and tradeat prices
PIm and PIn, respectively. These prices are set by the issuers, in our case the investment banks, and
taken as given by investors.
Investors choose their portfolio (hIm;hIn) ¸0 to maximize the expected returns:
E[hIn'In +hIm'Im]; (P1)
7subject to the resource constraint
1 =PInhIn +PImhIm: (3)
It is important to stress that the implicit assumption of risk-neutrality is not a crucial but just a
simplifying assumption. The underlying crucial assumption here is the perfect substitutability among
new securities issued by di¤erent IBs. As long as this is true, there is no need even for a risk-averse
investor to diversify across several IBs securities. One security will guarantee that utility is maximized.
Risk-neutrality serves only the purpose of simplifying investors’ demand. So we restrict the analy-
sis to comparison of expected returns only and leave aside volatility considerations. These volatility
considerations can be accounted for by extending the model.
Since the optimization problem (P1) is linear, we will have a corner solution. Investors will only
demand a positive amount of the security which maximizes their net return, and demand zero of the











and similarly for the imitators’ security. In other words, investors will go for the best deal the market
o¤ers to them. Note that, how we de…ned the information structure, E('In) does not depend on the
particular innovator: any innovator will issue exactly the same security as theother innovators, and the
same if true of imitators.
We must stress a point relevant for the next section. The expected returns are an inherent charac-
teristic of the security while the corresponding prices are determined by the issuers so as to maximize
their pro…ts. Typically, in …nancial markets, the demand for the preferred asset will be perfectly elastic
8and its price will depend on its inner characteristics (volatility, dividend or payo¤ stream).9
4.2 Investment Banks
There is a …xed number I of IBs in the economy. The pro…ts of the i-th IB are:
¼i =(Pi ¡C)qi; (5)
where qi is the quantity of the security sold to investors by the i¡th bank, Pi is its price, and C the
operating cost for each unit of the security, which is the same for all IBs. . The results of this paper
do not change if we assume that the innovator’s advantage translates into lower operating costs for
managing the new …nancial product, rather than higher expected returns of the latter.10
IBstry to sell their newly issued security toinvestors by choosingitspricePi. For any given expected
return of a new security, the IB that charges the lowest price obtains the entire market. To make sure
that this actually happens weassume that IBs haveno constraint on their issuing capacity, i.e., they are
e¤ectively Bertrand competitors. Having said this, we assume, as is usually done in Bertrand models
that, whenever the lowest price is charged by more than one IB the demand is shared evenly among
them.
5 The One Innovator Case
Suppose only one of the I IBs has incurred an R&D sunk cost Ki in order to design a new security.
Therefore, he will be the innovator (In) for this particular innovation, while the remaining I ¡1 IBs
9Of course, demand will be horizontal until it reaches the full capacity investors are willing to hold, q; then it drops to
zero.
10We have assumed that the innovator’s informational advantage is re‡ected in a higher expected value for his product:
E('In) > E ('Im): Altenatively, we could have proceeded by assuming thatthe advantage was re‡ected in a lower marginal
cost, i.e., CIn < CIm; that would allow the innvoatot to have a higher margin. Lower operating costs can be the result
of smaller accounting losses due to lower chances of making mistakes in the pricing or in the enginering choices of the
product.
9will be imitators (Im) and will try to free-ride on this unprotected discovery.11
In this scenario, the innovator will enjoy a monopolistic advantage over all the (I¡1) imitators.
Taking the logarithm of the inequality (1), this advantage will be summarized by the inequality:
"('In) >"('Im); (6)
where "('i) ´ln E('i): Also, taking the logarithms of the demand inequality 4 we have:
"('In) ¡pIn > "('Im) ¡pIm; (7)
where pi ´lnPi.
All IBs compete in prices a la Bertrand to maximize their pro…t, ¼. Since Ins and Ims are selling
products that are di¤erent they will, in general, be charging di¤erent prices. In this Bertrand game
pIm is the imitators’ strategy, i.e., the price he charges for his security. Likewise, pIn is the innovator’s
strategy.
Let us now analyze the best responses. Taking the value of pIm as given, the In will choose pIn
depending on that value: This will be the highest price that still secures to the In all the investor
demand ¹ q and a positive pro…t. That is:
pIn ="('In) ¡["('Im) ¡pIm] ´¢' +pIm: (8)
pIn is the price that makes consumers indi¤erent between purchasing the innovator’s security or the
imitators’s security. Imitators’ best response given any pIn is to lower pIm to try to capture some
market share. This process of mutual price undercutting comes to a halt at marginal cost pricing:
11The case of one innovator can be thought of as the case which innovations are “rare”, i.e., the probability that there
will be two IBs that have invested in R&D and end up developing exactly the same security is zero.
10pIm =c ´ln C; that is, when Ims’ pro…ts shrink to zero. So, this Nash Equilibrium strategy pro…le is:
pIn = ¢' +c and (9)
pIm = c:
5.0.1 Equilibria with Weakly Dominated Strategies
There are other equilibria, in which Ims price below their marginal costs: pIm < c. This happens as
long as it is still pro…table for the In to get all the market by lowering pIn, leaving zero pro…ts for the
Ims. The interpretation of the Ims strategy in this equilibria is as follows: Ims are sure not to get any
market share; if they were, they would incur losses. The Ims can decide to charge less than marginal
cost since they will make zero pro…ts anyway. More speci…cally, Ims will be indi¤erent to price in the
following interval:
c¡¢' <pIm · c
This is the interval that guarantees that pIn ¡c >0, i.e., positive pro…ts for the In. The equilibria will
be then characterized by:
pIn = ¢' +pIm
c¡¢' < pIm ·c:
Note that for Ims, charging a price below marginal cost is weakly dominated by pricing at marginal
cost: pIm =c.
115.0.2 Equilibrium Selection
Among all the equilibria described, we will select the unique weakly undominated equilibrium, the
one given by the strategy pro…le (9). Note that pIm > c weakly dominates the equilibrium strategy
pIm = c; however it is never an equilibrium strategy. The equilibrium we select is the only one that is
weakly undominated, even though the Ims strategy is weakly dominated by all the other equilibrium
strategies.12
The In’s advantage has made it a stronger competitor and has guaranteed all theinvestors’ demand




¡1]C¹ q ´ b ¼In and (10)
¼Im = 0:
6 Welfare Distribution for the Case of One Innovator
Investors’ surplus generated by the innovation is given by the di¤erence between the maximum price
they are willing to pay for the new security minus the price they are actually charged, multiplied by
the quantity of the security purchased. Assuming that investors can always keep cash in their portfolio,
the price of any security cannot exceed its expected value:
E('i) ¸ Pi:
If this were not the case for the most pro…table security, the net returns for that security (and any
other) would be less than one. Hence, investors would rather hold cash that yields a unit return.
12In a discrete strategy space this corresponding equilibrium will, in fact, use weakly undominated strategies.
12The investors’ surplus derived from buying security i is de…ned by:
S ´ [E('i) ¡Pi]qi; (11)
where E('i) is themaximum price that investorsarewilling to pay forthat security. Further, weassume
that E('Im) >C so that there exist a price su¢ciently low such that:
E('Im) ¡PIm ¸0 and PIm ¡C >0:
The …rst inequality states that investors will …nd the Ims’ new security more pro…table than cash. The
second inequality states that at the price PIm the issue is pro…table for the Ims.
In the Bertrand Equilibrium (9), only the innovator’s security is sold at a price given by:




Thus, the investors’ surplus in this equilibrium is:





The total surplus generated by an innovation is de…ned by:
W ´S +(¼¡K); (14)
13where ¼¡K is the aggregate …rms’ pro…ts (given in (5)) net of the total costs of R & D.13
In this scenario we see that the surplus generated by the discovery is shared between investors and
the In. Wewould like to emphasizethat this sharing is merely due to the presenceof imitators. Suppose
that imitation was impossible and there were no imitators in the market. Then, the innovator would
charge the highest possible price investors were willing to pay, PIn = E('In): This would leave no
surplus to the investors, i.e., there would be no surplus sharing:
S =0;
and
¼¡K = [E('In)¡C] q¡K =W: (15)
This hypothetical situation is depicted in the …rst panel of Figure 1.14 This case could correspond to a
casewith patents, if patenting a new …nancial design was possible. Thefact that patenting isimpossible
will restrain the innovator’s monopoly power and thus transfer some of the surplus to the investors.
This happens thanksto thepossibility ofimitation. Even though imitators do not supply thesecurity in
equilibrium, their mere presence guarantees that PIn < E('In): investors surplus is positive (as given
by (13)) and the innovator’s is reduced to: b ¼In ¡K (as given by (10)). The aggregate surplus, though,
is the same for the case with or without imitation. Panel 2 of Figure 1 illustrates this situation.
6.2 Discussion
The share, S; of the total surplus, W; that goes to investors depends crucially on the imitation side,
namely on E('Im). The fact that other IBs can create, by simple imitation, a security that investors
13We have now assumed that R&D costs are homogeneous across IBs. Introducing heterogeneity costs would not alter
the main qualitative results, e.g., the equilibria and the welfare implications remain unchanged.
14In this picture we have omitted the innovator’s sunk cost K since, at this stage, it does not have any bearing on the
results.
14Panel 1: No imitation, 1 innovator Panel 2: 1 Innovator, I-1 imitators
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Figure 1: Surplus Sharing with One Innovator
are willing to buy at a price higher than the marginal cost, C; of issuing it, guarantees that consumers
will bene…t from this new technology. The possibility of free imitation is what cuts down the pro…ts of
the innovator.15
Themore imperfect theimitation, i.e., thelarger thewedge between E('In) and E('Im); the higher
the innovator’s pro…ts. Conversely, the more precise imitation is, the lower the innovator’s pro…ts and
the larger the share of the total innovation surplus that goes to the investors.
From a welfarepoint ofview, it ispossibleto rationalizethedecision of a regulator, e.g., the USPTO,
to refuse a patent for a new security design. If the regulator is concerned about investor’s welfare, by
denying patent protection he allows investors to capture some of the surplus. Furthermore, surplus is
transferred directly from the innovator to investors without changing aggregate welfare.16
15This result is in the spirit of Baumol, Panzar and Willig’s [2] argument for contestable markets. In their theory, a
monopolist cannot price above marginal cost due to the possibility of free entry. Our result is not as extreme as theirs
because the innovator is still pricing above the operating cost C and making pro…ts. What is very similar is that imitators
sell nothing in equilibrium and the mere threat of entry is enough to drive prices down from the monopoly level.
16There are no deadweight losses in this analysis since the demand curve is perfectly elastic.
157 The Innovation Game
We now turn to theanalysisofinnovations that are “obvious” to all the IBs and thus, all of them simul-
taneously face the decision wether to pursue their development. We describe the following innovation
game. We have players denoted by i = 1; 2;:::; I , which represent I IBs. The game can be summarized
in two subsequent stages.
- In the …rst stage players face a binary choice: to innovateor not. If they choose to innovate, they will
henceforth be called Ins. They will discover a new security with probability one, incurring the
sunk R&D cost Ki > 0: If not, they will be called Ims. They will imitate Ins’ security incurring
no development cost.
- In the second stage all IBs choose a price, Pi for their security. Ims can implement the new design
without paying the cost Ki but with a lower expected return (E['In] > E['Im]; imperfect
imitation). All IBs, ImsandInsalike, engagein pricecompetitionwhiletrying to captureinvestors
demand given by the schedule (4).
The payo¤s of the game are ¼i ¡Ki; where ¼i is given by (5), and are obtained by an analysis
similar to the one in Section 4. To bemore general, we can assume entry cost heterogeneity: for a given
innovation, IBs do not necessarily face the same development costs, Ki: This cost will depend on the
innovation at stake, i.e., theIB with lower Ki would be theonethat has the best infrastructure in place
to develop that particular innovation.17
In this game we will look for Subgame Perfect Equilibria only. For this purpose we proceed by
backwards induction.
17By infrastructure we mean human resources, software systems, client base, etc.
168 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
8.1 Second Stage Competition
In this section we describe and solve for the equilibria of the second stage subgames. Let IIm and IIn
be the number ofIms and Ins at the second stage of the game. Then IIm+IIn = I; and these numbers
are determined in the previous stage. We will analyze separately three scenarios. One In: IIn = 1,
more than one In: IIn >1 and no innovation IIn = 0. These three scenarios encompass all the possible
second stage subgames.
8.1.1 The Case of One Innovator
This case has already been analyzed in Section 4. We selected the unique Nash Equilibrium which was
weakly undominated within the set of Nash Equilibria.
In order to make innovation pro…table it would have to be the case that:
b ¼
In ¡Ki >0 8i =1;2; :::;I; (16)
where b ¼In is given by (10).18 In other words, the one innovator has to be able to recoup the sunk R&D
investment with the second period pro…ts obtained by selling his new …nancial product. Thus, what
makes a new security design pro…table is how imperfect its imitation is relative to its development cost.
We argue that for new securities being created this is true in general. This leaves open the possibility
that some innovations are not undertaken because imitation is too good.19
18One interpretation of this can be that only I IBs have the infrastructure in place to potentially pro…t from this
particular innovation.
19Of course, reputation issues are at stake. On the one hand, there is an intrinsic value from being recognized as a cutting
edge innovator in these markets. This may prompt innovators to even bear a pecuniary loss from tough competition. On
the other hand, the innovator is bearing all the risk in case the innovation is not successful, i.e., that it will not be marketed,
representing a pecuniary loss and no increase in reputation.
178.1.2 The Case of More than One Innovator
Proposition 2 In any second stage subgame in which the number of Ins is larger than one, Ins price
their securities at marginal cost in equilibrium and make zero pro…t:
Proof. Standard Bertrand competition among identical Ins will drive their price to marginal cost:
PIn;i =C:20
The total investor’s demand, q; will be shared equally by the Ins. In any event, all Ins and Ims will
make zero pro…t in the second stage. That is
¼i =0 8i = 1;2;:::; I: (17)
8.1.3 The Case of no Innovation
No further subgame starts at the information set where there is no innovation. The payo¤s are at this
node are:
¼Im = 0:21 (18)
8.2 First Stage Innovation Decision
In the stage of the innovation decision every IB, i; faces the binary choice: Innovate and pay Ki or do
not and imitate.
20In equilibrium, any Im will charge any price so that pIm;j ¸ C ¡¢': This is not relevant to our discussion.
21All IBs are potential Ims, but there is nothing to imitate.
188.2.1 Pure Strategy Equilibria
For each oneofthepossible scenariosabove, thenext proposition buildson the second stageequilibrium






In for One Innovator,
0 for more than One Innovator
;
¼Im = 0 always. (19)
We characterize the set of pure strategy equilibria using the following proposition.
Proposition 3 This game has I pure strategy equilibria in which one IB innovates and the rest imitate.
Proof. The player that innovates is making positive pro…ts, b ¼
In ¡ Ki; and will make zero by
deviating; the players that imitate are making zero pro…ts and will make ¡Ki < 0 by deviating.
No other pure strategy equilibria exist. More than one innovator is inconsistent with equilibrium
since innovators would make ¡Ki and …nd it optimal to deviate to make zero pro…t instead. No
innovation is not an equilibrium since for any IB it is optimal to deviate and make positive pro…ts
rather than no pro…ts. Since we have I players, we have then only I pure strategy Nash equilibria.
This game has multiple equilibria but we can identify a focal point. For a given innovation the IB
with the lowest R&D cost, Ki could be the one selected as the innovator. This is intuitive: the bank
with the best infrastructure already in place would be the developer. Notice that this is also the most
e¢cient outcome.
To summarize, we can see how any pure strategy equilibria of this game yield exactly the same
outcome as that in Section 4. Even though the innovation at stake is now assumed to be expected or
obvious, i.e., all IBs have the choice of becoming the only one IB will choose to do so in equilibrium
. So, the One Innovator outcome seems to be a natural one for any kind of innovation. Besides, the
19welfare analysis of Section 4 applies to these pure strategy outcomes.
For all the pure strategy outcomes, the regulator’s reason for not allowing patents is strengthened:
there is still the incentive to innovate without patents since the non-pro…table and ine¢cient outcomes
(the more than one innovator or the no innovation outcomes) are not equilibria.22 Thus, in the pure
strategy context, thepatent is not only unnecessary for…nancial innovation but precludes imitation and
surplus sharing with investors.
8.2.2 Mixed Strategy Equilibria
The innovation game has mixed strategy equilibria. To keep the analysis from being too burden-
some, we will consider only the symmetric game where R&D costs are identical across IBs, i.e.,
Ki = K i = 1;2;:::; I: Nonetheless, the main qualitative results obtained below will also hold with
R&D cost heterogeneity.
The symmetric game has a natural symmetric outcome. Let ® be the probability of innovating.








Proof. We look for a symmetric mixed strategy pro…le, ®, that makes every player indi¤erent














22We will show below that non-pro…table and ine¢cient outcomes can arise from mixed strategy equilibria ex-post.
However, mixed strategies are unlikely to be implemented in investment banking: it is debatable that IBs would, in any
real …nancial decision context, randomize over the choice between innovating or not. To be indi¤erent between these
choices is highly unlikely because there are so many factors involved in such an investment decision.
20which yields the desired result.
Since b ¼
In ¡K > 0; the above ratio is strictly between zero and one and therefore so is ®, given that
J ¸2: In other words, we have a strictly mixed strategy equilibrium.
We will now generalize the result: all the possible equilibria of the symmetric version of the game
can be characterized and summarized in the following propositions.








and the rest do not innovate.
Proof. See appendix.
The previous equilibria we found are just particular cases of the above. Note that for J = I we
re-obtain the unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium (shown in (20)). And, as J ! 1; by taking
the limit of the above expression we get ® = 1. So we are back to the pure strategy equilibrium, i.e.,
the One Innovator case.
Proposition 6 No other equilibria exist.
Proof. See appendix.
9 Welfare Analysis for the Innovation Game
9.1 Pure Strategies Case
We will now analyze thewelfare implications of all the equilibria, as summarized in Proposition 5. Bear
in mind that mixed strategies equilibrium outcomes can have more than one IB innovating ex-post. In
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Figure 2: Surplus Sharing with more than One Innovator






where, as usual, investors’ surplus is S; the aggregate innovators’ pro…ts
PIIn
i=1 ¼In
i ; and the total
costs of R & D are
PIIn









In for One Innovator
0 for more than One Innovator
: (22)
When more than one IB innovate, they make zero pro…t. The entire surplus created by the innovation




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 for no Innovation,
E('In)[1¡ C
E('Im)]q for One Innovator,
[E('In) ¡C]q for more than One Innovator
, (23)
where the middle case comes from (13). Failure to innovate, of course, creates no investor’s surplus.
Given the de…nition (21) of total surplus W and using (10), we have:
W =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 for no Innovation,
[E('In) ¡C]q ¡K for One Innovator,
[E('In) ¡C]q ¡IInK for IIn >1 Innovators
. (24)
9.2 Mixed Strategies Case
Ex-ante, any number of innovators could bean outcome in themixed strategy equilibrium. Thenumber
of IBs not choosing ® = 0 will determine a distribution of the random number of innovators IIn over
f1; 2;:::; Ig: For the symmetric case, this distribution implies the following probabilities:
Pr(IIn =0) = [1¡®]
J ;
Pr(IIn =1) = J [®(1 ¡®)]J¡1 ;
Pr(IIn ¸2) = 1¡[1¡®]J ¡J [®(1 ¡®)]J¡1 : (25)
Let us focus on the symmetric equilibrium of this game. In our notation, …x J = I so that all IBs



















In this case the surplus is allocated exactly like in the pure strategy equilibrium case: it is maximized
on aggregate. Second, with probability K
¼In
I
I¡1no innovation occurs. This is a very ine¢cient outcome
since no surplus whatsoever is generated.
In this mixed strategy scenario, the higher the Pr(IIn ¸ 2) the higher the expected surplus of
investors. Further, we can verify by di¤erentiating (25) that Pr(IIn ¸ 2) is increasing in ®. From
equation (20) we can see that, ceteris paribus, ® can be increased by a reduction in the cost K , the
R&D cost IBsmust pay to innovate, which is…xed exogenously. Hence, only a subsidy to R&D can ease
the cost-burden the IBs face if they want to innovate and make them choose to do so in equilibrium
with a higher probability ® at the bene…t of investors.
9.3 E¢ciency Analysis
The total welfare introduced by an innovation will be maximized when the aggregate R&D costs are
minimized, i.e., in the One Innovator outcome. In this case there are no ine¢ciencies since only one
agent, the innovator, pays the sunk cost of R&D. More innovators bene…t investors: two innovators are
su¢cient to give the maximum surplus to investors. Any outcome with more than two innovators is
Pareto Dominated by thetwo innovatoroutcome: S is the sameforboth cases but at least one innovator
is strictly worse o¤ because it is now making ¡Ki < 0 pro…ts. The No Innovation outcome is Pareto
Dominated by the One Innovator Case: S becomes positive and one IB makes b ¼In ¡ Ki > 0. Thus,
the only two Pareto Undominated outcomes are the ones with one and two innovators. The former has
higher total welfare W; but the latter has a higher investor surplus S:
For the innovation surplus to be created it su¢ces that one IB pays the sunk cost. Hence, each
24additional innovator afterthe …rst oneintroduces a deadweight loss. Thetotal deadweight lossincreases
linearly in the number of innovators while the total gains remain constant.
10 Summary
We have shown that in the outcome of an innovation game, at least one IB will …nd it pro…table to pay
the costs of R&D despite the absence of patent protection. Even in the case of pure strategies, we …nd
equilibria where one IB innovates. What drives this result is the fact that imitation is imperfect, i.e.,
that imitators have a less re…ned information set on the true state of nature.
Innovationsarepro…tableex-post for IBs only in the pure strategy equilibrium scenario. In thiscase,
free but imperfect imitation limits the monopoly power of the innovator to the bene…t of consumers.
In the mixed strategy scenario ine¢ciencies may arise: no innovation can occur with positive prob-
ability. In any mixed equilibrium, all IBs make zero expected pro…ts and consumers obtain a positive
expected surplus.
We have also shed some light on why patents are not allowed for innovative …nancial products. If
the …rst-mover obtains better knowledge of the state of the world, the innovator has an advantage over
imitators despite the revelation of his design. So, grant of a patent gives monopoly power to the patent
holder without ofsetting bene…t. In fact, innovation can still be pro…table with imperfect imitation.
Further, the patent precludes investors from sharing any of the surplus.
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2611 Appendix
Proposition 7 E['In] >E['Im]:
Proof. Let us de…ne the problem …rst.
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be the maximized value of 27.













be the returns for each element j of the partition.
Claim 8 8j, 'In(j) ¸'Im(j):








The intuition is that the innovator is maximizing the right objective, whereas the imitator does not
know the right objective and will optimize to the best of his knowledge. This means that in general the
27inequality will be strict. We haveshown this way that the innovator’s security dominates in expectation
the imitators’ one.
Proposition 9 For I ¸ 2 we have mixed strategy equilibria of the form: ®i = ®; i = 1;2;:::; J and
®i =0; i = J +1; :::;I .
Proof. This proof shows a characterization for all the equilibria of this game.
Suppose we have I ¸ 2 IB and J · I of them innovate with a probability ® 2 (0; 1), while I ¡J
do not innovate. Without loss of generality pick the following strategy pro…le: ®i = ®8 i = 1; 2;:::; J
and ®j = 0 for j = J +1; :::;I .Take any player of the J IBs that plays the strictly mixed strategy. It
will be indi¤erent between innovating or not. As we have seen in the previous section, the pro…t from
not innovating is zero, since innovators take over all the market. Pro…ts from innovating are given by
b ¼
In ¡K > 0 if no other IB innovates, and by ¡K if at least another IB innovates. Associating the

































which tells that they are strictly better o¤ by not innovating, i.e., by choosing ®i =0 i =J +1;:::; I:
Note that for every: J =1;:::; I we will have an equilibrium of this type.
As we noticed before the pure and the symmetric outcomes of this game are included in the set of
equilibria described in the previous proposition.
Proposition 10 No other equilibria exist.
The proof of this Proposition is given by the following three lemmas.
Lemma 11 There are no asymmetric totally mixed strategy equilibria in this game.
Proof. Suppose a totally mixed strategy pro…le (®1;®2; :::;®I) is an equilibrium, with ®is not all
equal. Then every playermust beindi¤erent, i.e.: E
£
¼In¤


















The RHS is constant, whereas theLHS depends on j because the®is are not all equal. Hence the above
equality cannot hold simultaneously for two players with di¤erent ®is. So forany totally mixed strategy
pro…le, not all players can be made indi¤erent and the equilibrium will not survive.
Lemma 12 No other equilibria exist with a di¤erent support other than the two point support: f0; ®g:
29Proof. Any equilibria where agents can choose di¤erent probabilities: ®i 2 f0;®;®0; ®00;:::g for
i = 1;2; :::; I, will be ruled out by the same argument of the previous lemma, that is, no asymmetric
totally mixed equilibria exist. This relies on the fact that the players are identical and that in order to
mix you must be indi¤erent to the strategy pro…le you face.
Lemma 13 No partially mixed equilibria exist with ®i =1 for some i:
Proof. If one player innovates for sure then all other players will strictly prefer not to innovate. So
we are back to the initial pure equilibrium.
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The University of Geneva 
The University of Geneva, originally known as the Academy of Geneva, was founded in 1559 by Jean Calvin 
and Theodore de Beze.  In 1873, The Academy of Geneva became the University of Geneva with the 
creation of a medical school.  The Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences was created in 1915.  The 
university is now composed of seven faculties of science; medicine; arts; law; economic and social sciences; 
psychology; education, and theology.  It also includes a school of translation and interpretation; an institute of 
architecture; seven interdisciplinary centers and six associated institutes. 
 
More than 13’000 students, the majority being foreigners, are enrolled in the various programs from the 
licence to high-level doctorates. A staff of more than 2’500 persons (professors, lecturers and assistants) is 
dedicated to the transmission and advancement of scientific knowledge through teaching as well as 
fundamental and applied research. The University of Geneva has been able to preserve the ancient European 
tradition of an academic community located in the heart of the city. This favors not only interaction between 
students, but also their integration in the population and in their participation of the particularly rich artistic and 
cultural life. http://www.unige.ch 
 
The University of Lausanne 
Founded as an academy in 1537, the University of Lausanne (UNIL) is a modern institution of higher 
education and advanced research.  Together with the neighboring Federal Polytechnic Institute of Lausanne, 
it comprises vast facilities and extends its influence beyond the city and the canton into regional, national, and 
international spheres. 
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